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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes was seen as a 
potential game-changer.1 The lower court had certified the plaintiffs’ 
million-member class in a lengthy and careful decision that had been 
twice affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals2 When the 
Supreme Court vacated the class certification, there was a sense that the 
decision might mark the death-knell of employment discrimination class 
actions based on claims of intentional discrimination.3 This was 
* Michael Selmi is the Samuel Tyler Research Professor of Law at George Washington University
Law School. Sylvia Tsakos is a third-year law student at George Washington University Law 
School.1.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011). 
2. The en banc decision from which the Supreme Court opinion sprung is available at Dukes
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). A three-judge panel issued an
earlier decision upholding the district court’s class certification opinion. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 
Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). The district court’s certification decision was issued seven 
years before the Supreme Court opinion. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. 
Cal. 2004). 
3. For a sampling of the initial responses, see Warren Richey, Supreme Court Dismisses
Women’s Class Action Lawsuit Against Wal-Mart, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 20, 2011, at A1 
(noting that Marcia Greenberger of the National Women’s Law Center called the ruling “a 
devasting decision”); Steven Greenhouse, After the Wal-Mart Decision: Heavy Blow for Big Cases 
and Lawyers Who Bring Them, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at B1 (discussing difficulty the Supreme 
Court decision posed for future class actions); David G. Savage, Wal-Mart Bias Case Tossed Out: 
High Court Makes Filing Class-Action Discrimination Suits Much More Difficult, BALT. SUN, June 
21, 2011, at 7A (“Columbia University law professor John Coffee said the Wal-Mart ruling all but 
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particularly important since there had been a wave of such cases prior to 
the Wal-Mart case.4 
The view of Wal-Mart as a game changer has proved inaccurate, 
though the decision seems to have significantly affected the number of 
case filings.5 The reduction in filings is an important development, but 
when one reviews the cases interpreting Wal-Mart, it appears that courts 
are proceeding much as they did prior to the Supreme Court decision. 
Employment discrimination class actions have never been easy to 
certify, nor have they been plentiful, and that remains true today. At the 
same time, courts that were receptive to class action claims prior to the 
Wal-Mart decision appear to remain receptive after the decision. As a 
result of Wal-Mart, the analysis by the lower courts varies somewhat, 
but the results are largely the same; to the extent a court would have 
certified the claim before the Supreme Court decision it will likely still 
be certified. Moreover, various efforts by defense attorneys to stretch the 
Wal-Mart decision to have claims dismissed even before a certification 
hearing have largely failed, although those efforts have undeniably 
escalated in the last several years.6 
This development in the law of employment discrimination class 
actions may seem puzzling at first glance, but when the Supreme Court 
decision is dissected closely, the reason for its limited effect becomes 
clear. The Supreme Court based its decision on a general hostility to 
class action litigation and, more specifically, to the particular substance 
and scope of the Wal-Mart litigation. Indeed, Wal-Mart presented a 
perfect storm for the conservative wing of the Supreme Court: a class 
sounds the death knell for class-action lawsuits that seek money damages from employers.”). 
4. Although the Supreme Court decision was not handed down until 2011, the case was
filed a decade earlier and followed on the heels of high profile discrimination cases (and 
settlements) against Home Depot, Texaco, Coca-Cola and a number of other large companies. See 
Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment 
Discrimination Litigation and its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2003). 
5. It is difficult to measure class action filings, not only because there are no statistics on the
number of employment discrimination class actions filed, but also because many cases that include 
class allegations may never proceed to class certification. One measure of activity is the annual 
report produced by the law firm Seyfarth Shaw, which reviews all published decisions. The 2014 
Report indicated that class filings appeared to be down; cases that proceeded as class actions tended 
to be smaller; and settlements were also fewer and smaller in nature. This all suggests that Wal-Mart 
had a significant effect on filing behavior. See SEYFARTH SHAW, ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS 
ACTION LITIGATION REPORT 2-6 (2014 ed.), available at 
http://www.workplaceclassaction.com/files/2014/01/CAR-2014.pdf. 
6. Prompted by Wal-Mart, defendants have aggressively sought to strike class allegations
from complaints without the benefit of any certification proceeding. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman 
Sachs & Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (denying motion to strike); Simpson v. Boeing 
Co., 27 F. Supp. 3d 989 (E.D. Mo. 2014) (denying motion to dismiss class claims). 
2
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claim alleging complicated issues of discrimination against a 
controversial defendant that was then placed in the hands of Justice 
Antonin Scalia. The end result was a blustery decision that, with one 
important exception, has been reasonably easy to distinguish and has 
produced few converts. The exception was the unanimous part of the 
Court’s opinion holding that class claims seeking individual monetary 
relief must be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 
rather than the far less expensive 23(b)(2) method, and that the cases 
cannot rely on a formula to determine damages.7 To date, this part of the 
opinion has received little attention, in part because these class cases 
take so long to adjudicate, but the switch to 23(b)(3) certification 
imposes substantial additional costs on plaintiffs who seek to pursue 
class claims. 
This Article explores the ramifications of Wal-Mart approximately 
five years after the case was decided. While five years hardly provides 
definitive data on how the case will be interpreted, it is possible to 
identify trends in the cases that have been decided to date—trends that 
are likely to provide insight into the future of class action claims. That 
future suggests that there will be fewer, and perhaps no, nationwide class 
actions in cases that do not involve a clear challenged practice (any such 
cases are likely to be disparate impact cases) and that the prospect for 
class certification will turn on the strength of the claim presented and the 
jurisdiction where certification is sought. All three of these conditions—
no nationwide class actions, the importance of the merits, and the 
jurisdiction—were present prior to the Supreme Court decision and 
represent only a modest change in direction. Equally important, class 
claims based on subjective employment practices remain viable despite 
the evident hostility to those claims reflected in Wal-Mart. 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH CLASS ACTIONS
In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, Justice Antonin Scalia begins the analytical 
portion of the majority opinion by noting, “The class action is an 
exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted on behalf of the 
individual named parties.”8 If by exception the Court meant empirically 
exceptional rather than the norm, no one could dispute that fact. Class 
actions have always comprised a small percentage of civil cases, 
including in the area of employment discrimination. But the Court—as 
7. See Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558-60 (U.S. 2011). See also
discussion infra Part III. 
8. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979)). 
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reflected in the rest of its majority opinion—seems to mean something 
different from a mere empirical observation. 
To many, and this appears to include a majority of the current 
Supreme Court, class actions are aberrational and out of place in the 
world of civil lawsuits because they pose certain risks to defendants.9 In 
particular, the cost of litigating class actions, combined with the 
potential liability to a class of individuals, can place substantial pressure 
on defendants to settle cases: not because the claims are meritorious, but 
because they are expensive. For example, Wal-Mart was litigated for 
nearly ten years before the Supreme Court dismantled the class, and the 
company’s potential liability exceeded several billion dollars.10 The 
needed investment to litigate such a large claim and the potential 
liability places substantial pressure on defendants to settle and, relatedly, 
creates incentives for plaintiffs to pursue claims solely with intent to 
extract a settlement. This focus, however, on the costs to defendants 
ignores the substantial costs and risks to plaintiff attorneys. In the Wal-
Mart litigation the plaintiffs litigated the case for ten years and 
accumulated substantial costs that were never recouped. No plaintiff 
would take on such a case lightly. It is also worth noting that Wal-Mart 
did not settle the case during its ten-year life nor was there any 
indication that the plaintiffs pursued the case with an eye towards 
producing a nuisance settlement. In other words, in the case used to 
highlight the problem of class action litigation, there is no indication a 
nuisance settlement was ever sought or obtained. To be sure, there is 
little question that employers—and their advocates—have a keen interest 
in rendering class actions more difficult to bring, but the same cannot be 
said for courts, which should be neutral towards the propriety of class 
actions. After all, class actions have been a recognized means of 
adjudicating collective claims for more than seventy years.11 
Class actions and their equivalents have also been central to the 
9. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional
Rule 23, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1110 (2013) (“By making massive damages liability turn 
on the outcome of a single suit, the class action can increase litigation risks so dramatically that 
defendants might settle even frivolous or weak class actions rather than take their chances at trial.”). 
10. The company’s potential liability was tied to the size of the class. The discrimination
claim was brought pursuant to Title VII, which provides for damages up to $300,000 per individual 
for claims of intentional discrimination. The size of the class was hard to pinpoint, and estimates 
varied between 500,000 and 1.5 million, which would suggest a potential liability of between $1.5 
to $4.5 billion. 
11. The precursor to what is now Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
included in the 1938 rules. For a concise history of the rule, which was overhauled in 1966, see A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality and Declining Access to Justice, 93 
B.U. L. REV. 441, 453-54 (2013). 
4
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development of employment discrimination law. Many of the early cases 
were, in fact, class claims; though it should be noted that neither the 
United States government nor the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission need satisfy the civil procedure requirements of private 
litigants, and these government agencies were behind many of the early 
cases.12 But many of those early cases sought to resolve classwide 
discrimination, and there was rarely any objection to proceeding on a 
collective rather than an individual basis.13 One reason for this is that 
when an employer’s practice is challenged as affecting a large group of 
employees, it is more efficient for all sides to proceed collectively rather 
than through hundreds (or thousands) of individual cases.14 Employers 
oppose collective actions not because they are more expensive than 
individual adjudications but because they are aware that most 
individuals would never file claims, even if meritorious; individual 
claims are less expensive due to their absence, not because of the 
expenses associated with class action litigation. If employers were 
forced to choose between a class action claim and thousands of 
individual claims, they would almost certainly choose the class action. 
But the choice they perceive is different, namely between a class action 
and no (or a handful of) individual claims, and for a potential defendant, 
that choice is easy. 
Most of the early employment discrimination class action cases 
were not particularly complicated, and objections to proceeding as a 
class were rarely raised—many of the cases either involved a policy that 
was clearly facially discriminatory or that required a court to determine 
12. Important early cases that proceeded as class actions included Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); E. Texas Motor Freight Co. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); 
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). The well-known disparate impact case, 
Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), appeared to be a class action but neither the Supreme 
Court nor the appellate court decision make reference to a class. In General Telephone Co. of the 
Northwest, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Supreme Court held that the 
EEOC (and by implication the Justice Department) could seek classwide relief without obtaining 
class certification. 446 U.S. 318 (1980). Cases in which the United States pursued the equivalent of 
class claims included Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Hazelwood 
Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986). 
13. One exception was General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, which the Court
relied on extensively in its Wal-Mart decision and is discussed further throughout this Article. 457 
U.S. 147 (1982). 
14. As one noted class action commentator has explained, “Once organized around the
systemic treatment of women at the giant Wal-Mart firm, the class action was clearly the superior 
mechanism to examine a set of institutional practices that either promoted discrimination or allowed 
the prospect of discriminatory behavior to foster.” Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, 
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 699, 711-12 (2013). 
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whether the policy was discriminatory under the law.15 Problems began 
to arise when plaintiffs moved away from such challenges and into the 
more complex issues of widespread, or classwide, discrimination not 
traceable to a single practice—what are often referred to as subjective 
employment practices.16 These practices typically involve the exercise of 
discretion by company supervisors, often without much formal guidance, 
and are the type of practices that were at issue in Wal-Mart.17 
This movement to challenge companywide subjective employment 
practices began in the 1980s but accelerated after the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made damages available for claims of 
intentional discrimination, including challenges to subjective decision-
making. This addition of a damages remedy immediately and 
dramatically increased employers’ potential exposure to liability. 
Discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act went from being about modest lost wages, backpay, and attorney’s 
fees to raising the specter of punitive and compensatory damages of up 
to $300,000 per class member.18 This was a substantial change and one 
that sparked an interest in class claims of intentional discrimination and 
away from disparate impact claims; but it was a change promulgated by 
Congress and surely not something courts, as opposed to employers, 
should have been concerned about, assuming they sought to apply the 
law in a neutral fashion. Many courts did just that, and one aspect of 
employment discrimination class action litigation that has proved 
problematic is that courts often approach the cases from very different 
perspectives. This schism occurred shortly after Congress passed the 
1991 Civil Rights Act, as a number of courts concluded that the new 
damage remedies rendered class action certification inappropriate 
because individual damage issues would predominate.19 This was a 
15. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1997) (exclusion of women from male prisons);
Bazemore, 478 U.S. 385 (discriminatory pay policy in place before Title VII became effective 
against public employers); City of L.A., Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) 
(women required to contribute more towards pensions because of their presumed longer lifespan). 
16. In the Supreme Court, the issue of subjective decision-making came up most directly in
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank, where the Court held that subjective decision-making could be 
challenged under the disparate impact model of proof. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
17. As discussed in the next section, the litigation challenged a number of different practices,
but the focus was always on the lack of objective criteria for pay and promotion. 
18. The damage provisions that were part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are included in a
separate statute and provide for damages of up to $300,000 depending on the size of the employer. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(3) (2012). It is always worth adding that the damage caps have not been 
altered since 1991 and, taking into account inflation, those damages are now worth about $172,000; 
to bring them to parity with the 1991 levels, the caps should be approximately $522,000. 
19. The most influential case to hold that the new damage provisions generally rendered
6
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substantial change from prior practice when the lost wages or backpay 
calculations, which always involved individual determinations, were 
routinely handled through class proceedings.20 Other courts, however, 
determined that the presence of damages did not remove the cases from 
appropriate class certification and found a number of ways to certify the 
discrimination cases.21 This circuit split created clear incentives for 
plaintiffs to file their claims in more receptive jurisdictions and likely 
contributed to the pressure to bring nationwide class actions in friendly 
locations rather than to proceed in multiple jurisdictions. At this time, 
prior to Wal-Mart, courts varied considerably in how they approached 
employment discrimination class actions, with some jurisdictions more 
receptive than others; the differences in approach seemed to spring from 
judicial philosophies rather than any neutral principle of law. 
Class actions pose two potential problems that warrant judicial 
scrutiny. The rights of absent class members, for example, certainly fits 
within a traditional judicial concern; but at the same time, the procedures 
established by Congress should satisfy whatever due process concerns 
may exist. Indeed, when the Supreme Court created rights for 
individuals to challenge prior class settlements during the height of its 
civil rights hostility, Congress promptly repudiated that decision.22 The 
Supreme Court has never suggested that the procedural protections of 
Rule 23 were in conflict with constitutional due process protections, so 
even a concern for absent class members seems, at this point in time, 
only a tangential judicial interest.23 Nevertheless, it is conceivable that 
an individual could find her claim has already been adjudicated through 
a class proceeding and would then be denied her day in court. This issue 
would arise primarily in a 23(b)(2) class action where the class 
employment cases unsuitable for class treatment was Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 
402 (5th Cir. 1998). 
20. See, e.g., Senter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976); Chisholm v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 488 (4th Cir. 1981); Gay v. Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, 549 
F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1977). 
21. The Second Circuit was the leader in permitting 23(b)(2) certifications with an occasional
nod to what came to be known as a hybrid certification, where the liability phase was certified under 
23(b)(2) and the damage phase under 23(b)(3). See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 
267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit, from which the Wal-Mart litigation arose, had 
adopted the approach of the Second Circuit. See Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2003). 
22. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (permitting collateral challenges to settlement
agreements). The case was one of the cases overturned by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
23. The Supreme Court long ago held that due process requires that absent class members be
given notice and an opportunity to opt out of a class action that might lead to substantial money 
damages. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985). For a discussion of 
what this due process concern requires, see Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the 
Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057 (2002). 
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challenged an employer’s practice, such as a written examination, and 
failed in that challenge. Ironically, a 23(b)(2) class does not require 
notice to class members, but the reason for that is because the class 
members are all similarly situated—if the test is valid for one class 
member, it is valid for all. Different class members might style their 
claims differently, but this is an area where the employer clearly benefits 
by having to defend its practice only once rather than fend off multiple 
challenges to the same practice. In other words, the rights of absent class 
members are of concern to putative plaintiffs, which are typically not the 
interests courts hostile to class actions seek to protect. 
The other potential problem is even easier to dismiss— the 
Supreme Court’s apparent concern that large class actions carry with 
them the potential for extortionate claims or what are also referred to as 
“blackmail settlements.”24 The argument is relatively straightforward 
and has played out for several decades: If the cost of litigating a class 
action will generally exceed the cost of a settlement, regardless of the 
merits of the claim, some employers (or defendants, more generally) will 
take the cheapest route and opt to settle. But this is a basic economic 
concept that applies to litigation strategies generally and is not unique to 
class actions—whenever litigation costs exceed the likely judgment, 
there will be economic pressure to settle the case. It should be noted, 
however, that many employers and defendants resist that temptation. 
The difference with class actions is twofold. First, the cost of 
defending such a claim is likely far higher than the run-of-the-mill 
lawsuit, and thus, settlements should likewise be higher with the 
concomitant pressure to settle more frequent. This issue has been 
extensively addressed in the literature, and suffice it to say, it is not a 
simple calculation of when lawsuits, including class actions, will lead to 
settlements that are independent of the merits of the litigation.25 To offer 
but one simple example: a defendant is likely willing to invest far more 
resources in a claim that raises substantial liability costs, compared to a 
low-value case that may not justify substantial resources, making a 
24. The concept of a “blackmail” settlement in the context of class actions has seeped into
some case law, perhaps most famously in an opinion written by Judge Posner. In re Rhone Poulenc 
Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of the potential for a “blackmail” 
settlement in the context of the Wal-Mart litigation, see Aaron B. Lauchheimer, A Classless Act: 
The Ninth Circuit’s Erroneous Class Certification in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 71 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 519, 549-52 (2005). 
25. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Some Thoughts About the Economics of Settlement, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1129 (2009); Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 
1 (2002). 
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smaller claim more likely to settle.26 
The second pressure to settle is related but often treated as 
distinct—many employers will opt to settle in order to avoid a massive 
judgment even when the probability of suffering such a judgment is 
low.27 Risk-averse defendants might opt for settling a low-probability 
but potentially substantial judgment case; but it is difficult to see why a 
court should seek to protect a defendant in such a situation, simply 
because there is much at stake. The response, it would seem, is that 
opportunistic plaintiffs are able to turn a modest claim into a substantial 
judgment by aggregating hundreds or thousands of weak claims.28 That 
may be true, but there are other tools to deal with such a situation, 
including motions to dismiss and sanctions, so that courts would not 
need to manipulate the standards for class certification in order to protect 
defendants from weak collective claims. It is also difficult to overlook 
the irony of law-and-economics-oriented judges and scholars 
demonstrating sympathy for what they would ordinarily define as an 
irrational fear by defendants. Not so long ago, it was a hallmark of law 
and economics that a 50% probability of recovering $10,000 should be 
treated the same as a 1% probability of recovering $500,000. Apparently 
a defendant’s fear of a low-probability but high judgment is now worthy 
of judicial protection.29 More to the point, there is simply no evidence 
that extortionate claims have been a problem within employment 
discrimination class actions. Several studies have documented that 
26. For critiques of the basic concept of “blackmail” settlements and explorations of the
many factors that play a role in class action strategies, see Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, 
“Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1377 (2000), and Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and 
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003). 
27. A common theme along these lines: “By making massive damages liability turn on the
outcome of a single suit, the class action can increase litigation risks so dramatically that defendants 
might settle even frivolous or weak class actions rather than take their chances at trial.” Bone, supra 
note 10, at 1110. 
28. The Amicus Brief of DRI–The Voice of the Defense Bar filed in the Wal-Mart case made
a similar argument: “The inevitable result is to intensify the pressure that a class certification order 
puts on a defendant to settle, making the class action procedure even more attractive for plaintiffs 
pursuing frivolous claims.” Brief for DRI–The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 20, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011) (No. 10-
277). 
29. Rationally calculating the expected value of a lawsuit was one of the original insights of
law and economics scholars. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of 
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 
Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067, 1076-77 (1989). 
The incorporation of behavioral economics has altered some of the analysis of rationality. For a 
helpful discussion, see Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000). 
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settlement rates are roughly similar between civil class actions and civil 
claims brought by individuals.30 In the context of employment 
discrimination cases, employers likely face more pressure to settle cases 
as a result of adverse publicity, an issue courts have generally not seen 
fit to consider.31 Some have even questioned the social utility of many 
consumer class actions, particularly those that lead to “coupon” 
settlements for class members and large fee awards for attorneys, and 
Congress addressed some of those issues by passing an act relating to 
class actions.32 
The fact that Congress acted to rein in what were seen as abusive 
filing practices suggests that this is an area best left to legislative redress 
rather than restrictive judicial interpretations, a position the Supreme 
Court staked out many years ago.33 Even so, there has never been any 
suggestion that employment discrimination class actions lead to a large 
number of nuisance settlements, and employees do not receive coupons 
as part of any settlement. In a study conducted by one of us a number of 
years ago, it appeared that the damage remedies created by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 led to a surge of filings and a preference for 
monetary over injunctive relief, but there was no indication that large 
numbers of weak claims had either been filed or led to substantial 
relief.34 If anything, the settlements were too modest to serve as an 
adequate deterrent against discriminatory behavior.35 
Not only is there some irony in the Supreme Court’s desire to 
protect defendants from what they consider “blackmail” settlements, but 
30. See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and Substantive Merits, 51
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1285 n.129 (2002); Silver, supra note 26, at 1401-02. 
31. It is always difficult to know what motivates a defendant to settle a claim, and most
defendants are unlikely to state that media attention or public pressure was the cause of a particular 
settlement. In studying several large settlements, it appeared to one of us that adverse media 
attention often played a substantial role in settlement determinations, particularly in the race 
discrimination claim against Texaco. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 1272-74. 
32. Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 to address some of the perceived
abuses that arose from class action litigation, including consumer class actions. See Pub. L. No. 
109-2, § 2(b), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005). The Act has not entirely eliminated abuses attendant to coupon 
settlements; for a recent and rather critical discussion, see Judge Posner’s decision in Redman v. 
Radio Shack Corp.,768 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2014) (vacating a class settlement). 
33. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344-45 (1979) (“[R]espondents argue that
the cost of defending consumer class actions will have a potentially ruinous effect on small 
businesses in particular and will ultimately be paid by consumers in any event. These are not 
unimportant considerations, but they are policy considerations more properly addressed to Congress 
than the Courts.”). 
34. Selmi, supra note 4.
35. Id. at 1315 (“[A]t least for the companies studied in this Article, the aggregate settlement
amounts are often too small to provide meaningful deterrence.”). 
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss4/4
2015] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS 813 
the Court has not expressed a similar concern for the ability of plaintiffs 
to pursue their claims, which is, after all, the other side of the blackmail 
coin. Class actions are designed not only to allow adjudication of claims 
that affect a group similarly, they also provide a vehicle for plaintiffs to 
pursue claims collectively that would not be economically viable on an 
individual basis. This has long been true of employment discrimination 
class actions where the monetary loss of salary can be modest—often 
too modest to attract competent counsel. As noted previously, in many if 
not most circumstances, when a class is not certified, it is unlikely that 
individual cases will ever be pursued. This seems at least as substantial a 
problem as the potential of nuisance settlements, and yet, in a recent case 
involving a class action waiver contained in an arbitration agreement, 
the Supreme Court was entirely dismissive of the lack of viability of 
individual claims.36 In dissent, Justice Elena Kagan made the argument 
that is essentially the mirror image of those who express concern 
regarding the pressure on a defendant to settle: “No rational actor would 
bring a claim worth tens of thousands of dollars if doing so meant 
incurring costs in the hundreds of thousands.”37 If nothing else, this all 
goes to show that little is neutral about class actions. 
Litigation poses inherent risks of settlement independent of the 
merits of the underlying claims, and one might conclude that those risks 
are more intense for class actions. How much more intense, no one can 
say or predict, and it strikes us as inappropriate that courts would seek to 
protect defendants by tightening the reins on class certification, 
particularly for employment discrimination claims where there is no 
empirical evidence of abuse.38 That is not to say that every employment 
discrimination class action is meritorious, but it is to say that the 
complexity of the cases and the relief typically sought (injunctive and 
monetary) provide some assurance against abusive practices. Equally 
important, and related to the developments after Wal-Mart, courts differ 
rather substantially in their approaches to class actions; some courts cast 
a skeptical eye towards the nature of aggregate litigation while others 
approach the cases from a more neutral stance, allowing them to proceed 
when the certification rules are satisfied without worrying about 
36. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (U.S. 2013)
(dismissing the argument that plaintiffs would “have no economic incentive to pursue their antitrust 
claims individually in arbitration”). 
37. Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
38. Then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor made a similar point in response to a dissenting judge’s
expressed concern for a blackmail settlement following class certification: “The effect of 
certification on parties’ leverage in settlement negotiations is a fact of life for class action litigants.” 
In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig. v. Visa USA, Inc., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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protecting defendants. 
III. THE PROBLEM WITH WAL-MART
For the conservative members of the Supreme Court, Wal-Mart 
arrived like a much anticipated birthday present. The case represented 
the largest class action employment discrimination claim ever filed, and 
the defendant was every liberal’s bête noire: Wal-Mart, notorious in 
liberal circles not just for low prices but also for low wages and 
destroying Main Street in the process.39 The package was even more 
enticing in that the case arrived from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
still regarded as among the most liberal Circuit courts. It would be 
difficult for a conservative court to ask for much more, although as it 
turned out, there was more. 
The case became known for its size (more than a million class 
members when the case reached the Supreme Court), but it also involved 
complicated issues of statistical proof of discrimination with reliance on 
social science findings to stitch together the class. Indeed, the 
opportunity for the Court to criticize the social science findings was like 
being served an extra piece of birthday cake without even having to ask. 
As we will see, the Court jumped into the dispute with both feet without 
considering how its opinion might ultimately be interpreted. 
Although the case was larger than usual, its underlying allegations 
tread on familiar ground. The plaintiffs demonstrated that female 
employees at Wal-Mart were disproportionately absent from 
management positions; the basic statistic was that although 70% of the 
workforce were women, only about one-third of the managers were 
women.40 This was known as a “pattern or practice” case, and under the 
framework that courts had developed going back some thirty years, this 
statistically significant disparity between the workers on the floor and 
the workers in the office was sufficient to commence a claim of 
39. A cottage industry has arisen around the effects of Wal-Mart and the literature is
substantial. See, e.g., WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CAPITALISM (N. 
Lichtenstein ed. 2013); ANTHONY BIANCO, WAL-MART: THE BULLY OF BENTONVILLE: HOW THE 
HIGH COST OF EVERYDAY LOW PRICES IS HURTING AMERICA (2009); David Neumark, Junfu Zhang 
& Stephen Ciccarella, The Effects of Wal-Mart on Local Labor Markets, 63 J. URBAN ECON. 405 
(2008). In several jurisdictions, Wal-Mart met heavy protests and legislation designed to compel the 
company to pay higher wages and benefits. 
40. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2563 (U.S. 2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 146 (N.D. Cal. 2004)) 
(“Women fill 70 percent of the hourly jobs in the retailer’s stores but make up only ‘33 percent of 
management employees.’”). 
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intentional discrimination.41 Importantly, those statistics can start a case, 
but they do not finish it, and it is necessary for the plaintiffs to provide 
some explanation for why the statistical disparities are the product of 
intentional discrimination. 
This is where Wal-Mart ran aground and where the size became 
problematic. Conceptually, a “pattern or practice” case lends itself to 
class treatment because it requires the plaintiff to prove that 
discrimination was the employer’s “standard operating procedure.”42 But 
in most of these cases, particularly the contemporary ones, there is not a 
single policy to which one can point as the discriminatory culprit; 
instead, it will be the employer’s culture or the cumulative effect of its 
practices that perpetuate discrimination within the firm.43 Again, to this 
point, there was nothing exceptional about the Wal-Mart challenge, and 
in fact, it was patterned after a long series of cases that involved 
discriminatory job assignments and promotional practices within grocery 
stores where it was common for women to be consigned to cash registers 
and departments that did not lead to managerial roles.44 
The difficulty with Wal-Mart was demonstrating that the disparities 
were the product of discrimination, and this is where the issues regarding 
the ultimate merits of the claim and the propriety of class treatment 
merged. Although Wal-Mart was notorious for its centralized 
distribution practices, it turned out to be just as notorious for 
decentralized employment practices. Most of the employment decisions 
that the class was challenging were made at the store level, and it was 
not so obvious how all of those decisions were related in a way that 
would justify class treatment. Store managers individually made hiring, 
promotion, and salary decisions within a proscribed range, and those 
decisions were formally approved at a regional level in a way that 
appeared perfunctory.45 This is where the question the Supreme Court 
confronted came into play: What did the million class members have in 
common? Could they, for example, point to common practices that had 
41. Prior to Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court had established the proof standards for “pattern
and practice” claims in two cases from the 1970s. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U.S. 324 (1977); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
42. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336.
43. For a discussion of what is sometimes called structural discrimination, see Tristin K.
Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 
VAND. L. REV. 849 (2007). 
44. For a discussion of the grocery store cases, which began in the 1970s, see Michael Selmi,
Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in the Preservation of Male 
Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1 (2005). 
45. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
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led to the observed gender disparities, and if so, were those common 
practices attributable to the company? 
The plaintiffs sought to address these questions by relying on 
various forms of evidence, including the social science evidence 
referenced earlier. By way of an affidavit submitted by an eminent 
sociologist who had been retained as an expert witness, the plaintiffs 
sought to show that the discretionary employment system established by 
Wal-Mart was the very kind of system that led to discriminatory 
results.46 Wal-Mart’s system was described as a classic subjective 
employment system in which management level employees, in this 
instance primarily store managers, are provided with little guidance on 
how to make their decisions and instead rely on their own beliefs and 
discretion to hire, promote, and establish salaries. It is well documented 
that such a system can lead to discriminatory results when the managers 
are men who likely rely on stereotypes for their decisions—stereotypes 
such as women are secondary earners, are not likely to be willing to 
relocate for a managerial position, and may not even be interested in 
promotions. This phenomenon is well established, and although a bit 
outdated, there was nothing particularly controversial about the expert 
affidavit the plaintiffs submitted.47 To the extent there was a problem, 
the argument made against Wal-Mart, which the plaintiffs buttressed 
with detailed statistical analyses, could be made against  just about any 
employer that relied on a non-objective hiring or promotion process. 
This may have been the case’s undoing; one could interpret the 
plaintiffs’ argument as stating that a discretionary (subjective) 
employment system was inherently discriminatory, and that was not an 
argument the Supreme Court was likely to accept. 
To distinguish Wal-Mart, the plaintiffs relied on about 100 
affidavits of class members and some scattered evidence about a culture 
at Wal-Mart that included stereotypical thinking about women. That 
culture purportedly included references to women at management 
46. Id. The plaintiffs’ primary expert on this issue, William Bielby, had been associated with
plaintiff employment discrimination claims for many years. See Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic 
Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 496-99 
(2011). 
47. By the time that the case reached the Supreme Court, the Affidavit, which typically did
not have research beyond 2000, appears outdated, but that was just a function of the time the case 
took to reach the Court. Although Bielby’s Affidavit accurately described the literature on 
discrimination and, in particular, the way unguided discretion can lead to discriminatory results, the 
use of such an affidavit to judge a specific workplace has proved controversial. For a defense of the 
use of social framework evidence and a discussion of the debate, see Melissa Hart & Paul M. 
Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class 
Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (2009). 
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meetings as “Janie Qs,” holding meetings at strip clubs, and other 
similar practices designed to show that women were not taken seriously 
as potential management employees.48 But the company’s size and its 
decentralized employment practices made this evidence all but irrelevant 
even to neutral eyes. The affidavits of one hundred employees—or one 
thousand for that matter—do not establish a pattern of discrimination in 
a company with several million employees, nor does it transform a 
statistical presentation into a compelling case of discrimination. The 
expert affidavit, which involved social framework evidence, offered 
some assistance, but its generic quality made it difficult to conclude that 
Wal-Mart’s system was anything other than “vulnerable” to 
discrimination, in the words of the plaintiffs’ own expert.49 
We have gone into such detail in order to demonstrate how fact 
specific the Wal-Mart case was and to show how the facts led the Court 
to write an opinion that has proven relatively easy for lower courts to 
distinguish. The very first line of the opinion begins, “We are presented 
with one of the most expansive class actions ever,” with the Court 
adding, “The District Court and the Court of Appeals approved the 
certification of a class comprising one and a half million plaintiffs, 
current and former employees of petitioner Wal-Mart who allege that the 
discretion exercised by their local supervisors over pay and promotion 
matters violates Title VII by discriminating against women.”50 One 
sentence later the Court emphasized Wal-Mart’s uniqueness by noting, 
“Petitioner Wal-Mart is the Nation’s largest private employer . . . Wal-
Mart operates approximately 3,400 stores and employs more than one 
million people.”51 Two paragraphs later the Court again mentions that 
the named plaintiffs represent “1.5 million members of the certified 
class,”52 a fact the Court emphasized again later in the opinion.53 
A substantial portion of the opinion—it appears to be more than 
half—focuses on the plaintiffs’ factual allegations and evidentiary proof. 
In the first four paragraphs, the Court takes note of the “discretion” 
vested in managerial decisions four times while also emphasizing the 
“subjective” nature of that promotional system.54 The opinion references 
supervisor “discretion” on nine additional occasions, making clear that 
48. See Brief for Respondents at 19-20, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(U.S. 2011) (No. 10-277). 
49. Id. at 35-36.
50. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2555.
54. Id. at 2547.
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one difficulty with certifying this particular class was that the policy at 
issue was “discretion” that supervisors might exercise in a variety of 
ways. The sheer size of the defendant—3,400 stores employing more 
than 1 million people—magnified the problem because, to the Court, it 
seemed unrealistic that managers across the country would exercise their 
discretion in a similar fashion absent some corporate policy that guided 
that discretion. And, as noted above, the plaintiffs’ experts were not able 
to say more than that they might do so. 
In this setting, it was perhaps natural for the Court to look for a 
discriminatory policy promulgated by the company directing the 
managers to engage in discriminatory hiring and promotional practices, 
but while such a search might be natural, it is inconceivable that any 
such policy would be located —not just at Wal-Mart, but at any 
company today. Yet, the absence of a discriminatory policy played a 
significant role in the Court’s decision. On several occasions, the Court 
stated, “The whole point of permitting discretionary decisionmaking is 
to avoid evaluating employees under a common standard.”55 Here the 
Court was emphasizing the lack of commonality among the gigantic 
class, and there was nothing extraordinary about the Court’s conclusion. 
Indeed, one could conclude, and it seems that lower courts have moved 
in this direction, that the Court’s discussion of the lack of commonality 
under Rule 23 did not break any new ground. Rather, the Court was 
effectively reviewing the lower court’s decision de novo and determined 
that certification was improper because of a lack of commonality. 
The Court, however, did not go so far as to conclude that a 
subjective decision-making system can never be challenged through a 
class action. The problem here was that the nationwide scope of the case 
made it particularly difficult to establish a common pattern of decision-
making. As previously noted, the plaintiffs sought to establish 
commonality through expert testimony regarding how subjective 
employment decisions often trade on stereotypes that then influence the 
decision-making process.56 The evidence was generic in nature as there 
was nothing specific about Wal-Mart other than describing its system as 
subjective. As a result, this evidence was relatively easy for the Court to 
dismiss, particularly as it related to class certification, because the 
evidence demonstrated little more than that Wal-Mart relied on 
discretion in making its promotional decisions—but that fact was never 
in dispute. 
55. Id. at 2553.
56. Id. at 2547.
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Again, these facts render the case relatively easy to distinguish. One 
can read the Court’s decision as holding that certification was 
inappropriate in the context of a nationwide class action that challenged 
the exercise of unfettered discretion by thousands of different 
supervisors located across the country without any common thread. Add 
a policy or a clear culture of discrimination and the conclusion might be 
different; downsize the scope of the class or even the size of the 
employer and the result might also be different; identify a specific 
practice or directive that might have informed the decision-making, and 
again, one would be looking at a different case. 
In contrast to its excessive focus on the facts, the Court’s treatment 
of the procedural requirements necessary to sustain a class was relatively 
vapid despite its evident hostility. Justice Scalia primarily relied on the 
thirty-year old case of General Telephone Co. v. Falcon and sprinkled 
the opinion with other cases from that era.57 Although the Court had not 
previously addressed the requirements for class certification in a “pattern 
or practice” case, Falcon appeared to be an odd choice for such prime 
treatment. That case involved what was then known as an “across-the-
board” class action where certain employees sought to represent 
applicants and employees throughout the company.58 The 
“commonality” question at issue in Falcon was whether there were any 
common interests between those denied promotions and those denied 
jobs.59 More than anything else, the case was about typicality rather than 
commonality.60 Indeed, the most extensive discussion of commonality 
regarding Falcon is found in the Wal-Mart decision, suggesting this was 
an unusual case to make the centerpiece of employment discrimination 
class actions and that will also likely make Wal-Mart easier to 
distinguish.61 
57. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). The Court also cited Cooper
v. Fed. Res. Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984).
58. As the Court stated in its opening paragraph: “The question presented is whether
respondent Falcon, who complained that petitioner did not promote him because he is a Mexican-
American, was properly permitted to maintain a class action on behalf of Mexican-American 
applicants for employment whom petitioner did not hire.” Falcon, 457 U.S. at 147. 
59. The Court stated, “Respondent’s complaint provided an insufficient basis for concluding
that the adjudication of his claim of discrimination in promotion would require the decision of any 
common question concerning the failure of petitioner to hire more Mexican-Americans.” Id. at 150. 
60. Id. at 159-60 (“Without any specific presentation identifying the questions of law or fact
that were common to the claims of respondent and of the members of the class he sought to 
represent, it was error for the District Court to presume that respondent’s claim was typical of other 
claims against petitioner by Mexican-American employees and applicants.”). 
61. The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision upholding class certification also turned to the
Falcon case for guidance, but it did so with a distinctly different approach than the Supreme Court. 
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The Court changed the law in one way that will impact class 
certification by shifting from 23(b)(2) to 23(b)(3) when damages are at 
issue, as they almost always are in employment discrimination class 
actions.62 This shift was actually overdue, and plaintiffs got away with 
23(b)(2) certifications for many years after their propriety became 
dubious. Historically, Title VII class actions have been certified under 
23(b)(2) because the statute did not provide for damages; injunctions 
were the primary remedy sought by the class. That ended with the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made damages available 
in claims of intentional discrimination, and yet, plaintiffs continued to 
seek certification under 23(b)(2) and many courts supported certification 
under that provision.63 The primary benefit of a 23(b)(2) certification is 
that there is no requirement to notify potential class members unless the 
class claim is successful, which offers a substantial cost savings to 
counsel for the class. 
Yet, in what should have been seen as a highly problematic move, 
many plaintiff classes—including the Wal-Mart case—opted to forego 
claims for compensatory damages as a way of ensuring that individual 
issues did not predominate over class claims so as to certify the claim 
under 23(b)(2). This tactic, which potentially relinquished a significant 
recovery for some or most class members,64 simply delayed the 
inevitable, which was seeking certification under 23(b)(3), a more costly 
but certainly not fatal approach. Importantly, contrary to the approach of 
several lower courts that found the presence of individualized damages 
defeated class certification under any standard, the Supreme Court 
clearly held that “individualized monetary claims belong in Rule 
23(b)(3).”65 
We note that certification under 23(b)(2) had appeal beyond the 
Most of the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of Falcon involved the question of whether the district court 
should look to the merits of the claim in determining whether class certification was appropriate, a 
question the court answered affirmatively. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 582-
87 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). In this regard, the court stated, “Falcon’s central command requires 
district courts to ensure that Rule 23 requirements are actually met, not simply presumed from the 
pleadings.” Id. at 582. 
62. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (U.S. 2011).
63. Such certifications were circuit specific. The leading case permitting certification under
23(b)(2) arose in the Second Circuit. See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 
147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001). 
64. The Supreme Court took note of this rather perverse fact. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559
(noting that by “declin[ing] to include employees’ claims for compensatory damages in their 
complaint” plaintiffs created the possibility that “individual class members’ compensatory-damages 
claims would be precluded by litigation they had no power to hold themselves apart from.”). 
65. Id. at 2558.
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obvious cost savings. Unlike other types of class actions, employment 
discrimination class actions will always seek some change in the 
employer’s practices, and that change in the form of an injunction will 
run across the class. The clearest example is a challenge to an 
employer’s written examination where the employer will have to alter 
the examination if the challenge is successful. A case like Wal-Mart that 
involves a challenge to subjective decision-making will also require 
injunctive relief, but the substance of that relief will often be hortatory 
rather than specific in nature, along the lines of requiring the employer 
to “do better.” A number of the well-known class action cases led to the 
formation of a diversity committee that monitored the employer’s 
progress, but it is rare that monitoring is considered more important than 
monetary relief.66 
IV. WAL-MART IN THE LOWER COURTS
In this section, we seek to illustrate the effect the Supreme Court’s 
Wal-Mart decision has had on lower courts, specifically in the context of 
class certification issues in employment discrimination claims. Wal-Mart 
has been widely cited, but its influence among employment 
discrimination cases—as opposed to other kinds of civil actions, 
including collective actions filed under the Fair Labor Standards Act67—
appears to have been modest and, one might even conclude, minimal. It 
is always difficult to make these kinds of assessments when the available 
field for analysis is limited to published decisions, but we believe that in 
the context of class certification decisions, relying on available 
published decisions is less a limitation than might be true in other areas; 
indeed, there is a distinct advantage in trying to measure the effect on 
class certifications. 
As noted previously, class certifications are relatively rare as 
measured against the pantheon of civil cases, and because they are more 
substantial, they are also more likely to result in a written decision that is 
reported in one of the many legal databases. As a result, if Wal-Mart is 
having an effect in the lower courts, it would likely appear among 
published decisions. Also, when a district court issues a decision on 
class certification, it is always subject to reconsideration as the case 
progresses,68 and we can assume that most defendants would have 
66. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 1324-25 (discussing and critiquing diversity committees
established as part of class action settlements). 
67. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012).
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order that grants or denies class certification may be
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moved to decertify a significant percentage of certified discrimination 
cases in light of Wal-Mart. The process of decertifying a class provides 
an opportunity to determine whether a case might have achieved class 
certification before, but not after, the Supreme Court decision and is the 
strongest indicator of the influence of that decision. 
There has not, however, been a rash of decertification decisions. In 
fact, based on the handful of reported cases involving motions to 
decertify classes, the requests have failed. Based on published opinions, 
we found only one case where a court decertified a class after Wal-Mart. 
That case was Ellis v. Costco, which was essentially a copycat case 
brought by the same attorneys who sued Wal-Mart, and the original class 
certification decision was reconsidered in light of Wal-Mart.69 The 
allegations in Ellis paralleled those lodged against Wal-Mart—the 
employer had engaged in subjective decision-making informed by a 
culture of sex discrimination that affected the company throughout its 
nationwide operations.70 In one other case, one minor claim was 
decertified while the decision to certify the main claim was affirmed.71 
Contrary to rumblings throughout the legal community that Wal-
Mart portended the destruction of employment class actions, the 
decision has not manifested as a death knell for class certification. 
Several lower court decisions, such as McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.72 and Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc.,73 
have illuminated postWal-Mart paths to class certification, signaling the 
continuing viability of class actions. 
In McReynolds, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s 
denial of class certification to a class of plaintiffs alleging racial 
discrimination under a disparate impact theory.74 Seven hundred 
African-American brokers, who were current or former employees of 
Merrill Lynch, based their claims on two policies that allegedly served 
as a framework for discretionary decisions that influenced compensation 
altered or amended before final judgment.”). See Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 
276 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting that a court “must be prepared under Rule 23(c)(1) to alter or amend [a 
certification order] if the court of the trial on the merits reveals the impropriety of class action 
maintenance” and that the reviewing court must likewise be prepared to review the propriety of 
class certification). 
69. See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (vacating certification
decision and remanding to district court for application of appropriate standard). 
70. Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627, 634-35, 638 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
71. See Parra v. Bashas’ Inc., 291 F.R.D. 360 (D. Az. 2013).
72. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012). 
73. Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105 (4th Cir. 2013).
74. McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 483. 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss4/4
2015] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS 823 
and were delegated to lower level managers.75 The challenged policies 
included a “teaming” policy that allowed brokers in the same office to 
form “teams” and determine team membership and an “account 
distribution” policy where, upon a broker’s departure from the company, 
the company would distribute those accounts to competing brokers with 
the best records, as determined by company criteria.76 The lower level 
management had a measure of control over how the teaming and account 
distribution operated. For example, they could veto teams or provide 
input for account distribution criteria—but ultimately, their decisions 
were guided by the two companywide policies: “authorization to 
brokers, rather than managers, to form and staff teams; and basing 
account distributions on the past success” of competing brokers.77 
The class alleged that the companywide policies enabled racial 
discrimination, thus causing a “disparate impact,” as brokers often 
formed their teams along racial lines. As a result, African-American 
employees experienced difficulty joining the predominantly white teams, 
resulting in a cycle of perpetuating disadvantages—team membership 
was associated with higher revenue, more clients, success in competing 
for account distribution when a broker left the office, and positive 
performance evaluations, which in turn influenced pay and promotions.78 
Judge Richard Posner, writing for the court, distinguished the 
McReynolds class from the Wal-Mart class primarily based on the 
existence of discernible, overarching policies from top management at 
Merrill Lynch. The policies served as the framework for discretionary 
decisions of lower level managers and brokers. Judge Posner described 
Wal-Mart’s holding rather narrowly: 
[I]f employment discrimination is practiced by the employing compa-
ny’s local managers, exercising discretion granted them by top man-
agement (granted them as a matter of necessity, in Wal-Mart’s case, 
because the company has 1.4 million U.S. employees), rather than im-
plementing a uniform policy established by top management to govern 
local managers, a class action by more than a million current and for-
mer employees is unmanageable; the incidents of discrimination com-
plained of do not present a common issue that could be resolved effi-
ciently in a single proceeding.79 
Thus, a policy meant to “govern” local managers’ discretion 
75. Id. at 487.
76. Id. at 488-89.
77. Id. at 489.
78. Id. at 489.
79. Id. at 487.
21
Selmi and Tsakos: Employment Discrimination Class Actions
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
824 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:803 
differentiates viable employment discrimination class actions that satisfy 
Rule 23’s commonality requirement from those with the Wal-Mart 
class’s infirmities.80 
The McReynolds class alleged two such governing policies 
instituted by Merrill Lynch’s top management—the teaming policy and 
the account distribution policy. Although discretion was allocated to 
brokers and local managers, the teaming and account distribution 
policies were practices of the employer, “rather than practices that local 
managers [could] choose or not at their whim.”81 The corporate policies 
were the overarching guidelines within which local managers and 
brokers had to exercise their discretion, whereas Wal-Mart was found to 
have lacked a uniform companywide policy by which local managers 
had to abide when exercising their delegated discretion in making 
employment decisions.82 The common issues under the plaintiffs’ 
disparate impact theory were therefore whether the policies caused racial 
discrimination and whether they were justified by business necessity—
issues “most efficiently determined on a class-wide basis rather than in 
700 individual lawsuits.”83 
Ultimately, the plaintiffs secured a $160 million commitment from 
Merrill Lynch to establish a common fund for the McReynolds class 
members, which included “all African-American financial advisers and 
financial adviser trainees” employed at the company after May 6, 
2011—a class much larger than the 700 individuals to which the 
McReynolds decision would have limited class treatment.84 The 
80. The court also seems to place emphasis on the size of the employer and the size of the
class as factors that may influence whether class treatment is appropriate. For example, although the 
possibility that an employer with millions of employees could institute a companywide policy to 
govern the discretion of all its local managers was not ruled out, the court seems to suggest this is an 
unlikely situation. Id. at 487. Further, the court seems to consider the size of the class (“more than a 
million current and former employees”) as a key factor in finding the Wal-Mart class 
unmanageable. Id. at 487. The McReynolds class of 700 current and former employees is miniscule 
in comparison. 
81. Id. at 490 (finding the case to survive Wal-Mart, which showed “on which side of the line
that separates a company-wide practice from an exercise of discretion by local managers this case 
falls”). 
82. Id. at 487.
83. Id. at 489-90.
84. Ben James, $160M Merrill Race Case A Road Map for Future Class Actions, LAW360
(Sept. 5, 2013, 7:32 PM), www.law360.com/articles/469131. Although the precise motivations 
behind any settlement agreement tend to be rather delphic, the court’s assertion that “should the 
claim of disparate impact prevail in the class-wide proceeding, hundreds of separate trials may be 
necessary to determine which class members were actually adversely affected by one or both of the 
practices and if so what loss he sustained,” and its observation that an erroneous injunction against 
Merrill Lynch’s teaming and account distribution policies “could disadvantage it in competition 
with brokerage firms that employ similar policies” may have been relevant considerations. 
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settlement agreement also incorporated injunctive relief, including 
Merrill Lynch’s commitment to scrutinize and restructure its teaming 
and account distribution policies, and to implement professional 
development programs for its African-American Financial Advisors and 
Financial Advisor Trainees.85 
Almost two years after McReynolds, the Fourth Circuit weighed in 
on the contours of the requirements for class certification under Wal-
Mart in Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc.86 The court found allegations 
of a uniform corporate policy and decisionmaking from higher-level 
management satisfied the commonality requirement for class 
certification and kept alive a proposed nationwide class of females who 
were current or former Family Dollar Store managers alleging they were 
paid less than their male counterparts.87 Their gender discrimination 
claims included allegations of disparate impact and pattern-or-practice of 
disparate treatment in violation of Title VII.88 
The plaintiffs challenged four companywide policies set by 
corporate headquarters, including (1) mandatory salary ranges for Store 
Managers which allegedly locked in disparities; (2) annual pay raise 
percentages that were tied to performance ratings; (3) “‘built-in 
headwinds’ compensation criteria for Store Managers” that allegedly 
caused a disparate impact; and (4) a “dual pay” compensation scheme 
that provided less compensation to individuals promoted to Store 
Manager than to individuals hired from outside the company.89 
As was true with McReynolds, the district court had initially 
granted Family Dollar Stores’ motion to dismiss or strike the class 
claims, which argued that dismissal was compelled by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Wal-Mart.90 The district court concluded that, as a 
matter of law, the plaintiffs could not satisfy the commonality 
requirement under Wal-Mart because they alleged gender discrimination 
based on “subjective decisions made at the local store levels.”91 
A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
denial to plaintiffs of leave to amend their complaint, finding the court 
McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 491. 
85. See Settlement Agreement and Release, McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., No. 05-C-6583, 2012 WL 5278555 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2013) (No. 585-1). 
86. See Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 117 (4th Cir. 2013), reh’g denied,
743 F.3d 886 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2871 (U.S. 2014). 
87. Id. at 108.
88. Id. at 108-09.
89. Id. at 110.
90. Id. at 109.
91. Id. at 110 (internal quotations omitted).
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had relied “on an erroneous interpretation of Wal-Mart.”92 The court 
declined to interpret Wal-Mart as a per se bar to class certification where 
plaintiffs alleged subjective discretion and noted two principles “readily 
derived” from the decision. First, where plaintiffs allege subjective-
decision making or discretion, managers must exercise discretion “in a 
common way with . . . some common direction.”93 Thus, plaintiffs must 
show “the exercise of discretion is tied to a specific employment 
practice,” which may include a companywide policy or culture of 
discrimination, and that the practice “affected the class in a uniform 
manner.”94 
The second principle the court derived from Wal-Mart was that 
commonality is more likely to be satisfied when “high-level corporate 
decision-makers” exercise control over discretionary decisions.95 
Drawing on McReynolds, the court noted that high-level corporate 
managers instituted Merrill Lynch’s teaming and account distribution 
policies, and while local managers exercised an amount of discretion, 
their decisionmaking was guided by the companywide policies.96 This 
differed from Wal-Mart, in which the plaintiffs did not allege a uniform, 
companywide policy guiding each of the independent, local supervisors 
at every Wal-Mart store throughout the country who were “vested with 
almost absolute discretion over pay and promotion decisions.”97 
Plaintiffs here alleged that corporate decision-makers, who had 
“authority over a broad segment of Family Dollar’s employees,” had the 
requisite control over discretionary decisions.98 For example, corporate 
Vice Presidents could grant upward exceptions to salary ranges and 
allegedly did so more often in favor of men.99 Additionally, Regional 
Managers and Divisional Vice Presidents could grant upward exceptions 
to the pay raise percentage and allegedly did so significantly more often 
for men.100 The dual pay policy was also a companywide policy in place 
at every Family Dollar Store that guided all decisions regarding pay of 
92. Id. at 108.
93. Id. at 113 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
94. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
95. Id. at 114.
96. Id. at 115.
97. Id. at 115, 117.
98. Id. at 118.
99. Id. at 116.
 100.  Id. The court suggests the “Regional Managers” and “Divisional Vice Presidents” are 
“high-level corporate decision-makers,” but under the court’s reasoning it may also be sufficient 
that the policies they followed in exercising their discretion were instituted at the corporate level, 
regardless of whether they are high-level corporate decision-makers. 
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hirees and promotees.101 
The Scott decision included a concurrence, which specified the 
“straightforward and limited” nature of the decision, and a blistering 
dissent, which alleged that the majority opinion “drained [Wal-Mart] of 
meaning.”102 In her concurrence, Judge Barbara Keenan emphasized 
what she considered to be the court’s narrow holding: “that the plaintiffs 
should be permitted to amend their original complaint after a dramatic 
shift in the law regarding class action certification.”103 
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson’s dissent asserted that under Wal-Mart, 
nationwide classes will rarely meet Rule 23’s certification 
requirements.104 He considered Scott almost identical to Wal-Mart, as 
both proposed classes encompassed thousands of “retail-level” current 
and former employees, and alleged discrimination against a national 
chain with thousands of stores in more than forty states.105 According to 
Judge Wilkinson, the majority opinion unduly limited Wal-Mart to cases 
in which low-level managers have complete discretion and implement 
their decisions on an “individual store level.”106 In his view, both cases 
fail to satisfy Rule 23’s commonality requirement because the 
decisionmaking structures were characterized by “dispersed decision-
makers exercising discretion . . . free of direct corporate control and 
oversight,” despite some centralized corporate policies that minimally 
constrained the decisionmaking.107 Ultimately, the dissent found the 
majority opinion punished companies “for nothing more than being 
companies” and forewarned that if “centralized delegations of 
discretion” and “common management techniques” are “enough for a 
nationwide class action to get rolling, then few companies will be 
exempt.”108 
A third case provides further indication that courts may be likely to 
distinguish rather than apply Wal-Mart, but it also suggests some of the 
hurdles plaintiffs may face, particularly at the district court level. The 
case, Stockwell v. City & County of San Francisco, involved an age 
discrimination challenge brought by a group of police officers who 
101.  Id. at 117. 
102.  Id. at 119 (Keenan, J., concurring) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
103.  Id. (Keenan, J. concurring). 
104.  Id. at 134-35 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“The gravamen of [Wal-Mart] is that nationwide 
classes face a steep climb to certification under Rule 23” and “class certification could . . . be more 
suitable for more modest . . . groups, such as district-level clusters”.). 
105.  Id. at 120. 
106.  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
107.  Id. at 120, 130. 
108.  Id. at 120. 
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objected to the City’s decision to stop using the results of a 1998 
examination because of its disparate impact.109 The district court denied 
class certification for lack of commonality, and the Court of Appeals 
reversed by exploring the meaning of commonality postWal-Mart. 
Relying on Wal-Mart, the court noted that “even a single common 
question will do” and added that, while some consideration of the merits 
would likely prove necessary, “demonstrating commonality does not 
require proof that the putative class will prevail on whatever common 
questions it identifies.”110 This distinction between the commonality 
inquiry and the merits related directly to the district court’s error in 
denying class certification. The district court questioned the relevance of 
the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence demonstrating a disparate impact, 
suggesting the absence of a regression analysis rendered the evidence of 
little probative value.111 The Ninth Circuit, however, saw the issue 
differently, noting that whether the plaintiffs could succeed in 
demonstrating a substantial adverse impact went to the merits rather than 
the certification question of whether the class members had an issue in 
common sufficient to warrant class treatment.112 That issue was rather 
straightforward: this was a disparate impact case that pointed to the 
abandonment of the old test as causing a disparate impact, and all of the 
class members would have been eligible for promotion from the old test. 
In other words, this was a traditional disparate impact case challenging a 
single policy and therefore identifying a common practice sufficient to 
satisfy Rule 23(b)(2).113 
 109.  See Stockwell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 749 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2014) . 
The history of the case and the underlying claim were complicated and a little puzzling. The case 
was originally filed in 2008 when the Department began to make promotions for investigation 
positions from a new test (Q50) instead of the preexisting list from the earlier exam (Q35). The 
purported class was comprised of individuals who were eligible for promotion from the older list, 
and they alleged that switching to the new test caused a disparate impact based on age; there were 
also allegations relating to a “pattern and practice” claim. The district court denied class 
certification, the plaintiffs filed an amended claim, and the district court again denied class 
certification; that decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The puzzle is why that process took 
six years with a relatively small class and a limited claim. 
 110.  Id. at 1112. Borrowing from its recent decision in the Costco case, the court added: 
“‘[W]hether class members could actually prevail on the merits of their claims’ is not a proper 
inquiry in determining the preliminary question ‘whether common questions exist.’” Id. (quoting 
Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
111.  Id. at 1115. 
112.  Id. 
 113.  In a case that sought decertification after Wal-Mart in a challenge to a physical fitness 
case, the court denied the motion opting instead to create a hybrid class that was certified under 
23(b)(2) for liability purposes and 23(b)(3) for damages. See Easterling v. State Dept. of 
Corrections, 278 F.R.D. 41 (D. Conn. 2011). 
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The significance of the case is the fact that the district court 
somehow saw the case differently in light of Wal-Mart , but the two 
situations could hardly be more different. Wal-Mart involved a 
nationwide claim alleging that the discretion invested in supervisors 
created a companywide pattern of intentional discrimination, and 
Stockwell involved a single policy implemented by a single employer 
that allegedly caused a disparate impact based on age. Courts sometimes 
get a decision wrong for any number of reasons, and it may be that the 
court here was led astray by the language employed in Wal-Mart, but the 
case might also provide a sign of the hurdles plaintiffs may have to 
overcome in the postWal-Mart era, even though an appellate court might 
be lurking in the wings to help sort things out.114 
We do not mean to suggest that Wal-Mart had no effect on 
employment discrimination class actions. Cases that closely resemble 
Wal-Mart, like the Ellis v. Costco case mentioned earlier, that involve 
nationwide challenges to subjective employment practices, are unlikely 
to obtain class certification.115 But it is important to emphasize that in 
many circuits those claims did not obtain class certification before Wal-
Mart, and it seems that jurisdictions receptive to class actions have many 
ways to distinguish the case. We also suggest that plaintiffs must 
reconsider how they use so-called social framework evidence, given how 
hostile the Supreme Court was to the use of such evidence in the Wal-
Mart litigation. Social framework evidence is designed to explain how 
discrimination infiltrates work cultures even without overt expressions 
of bias, and the evidence can prove enlightening to courts or juries who 
are likely unaware of just how pervasive discrimination remains. It is too 
early to know how plaintiff attorneys might retool this evidence, but it 
would certainly be helpful if plaintiffs were able to make specific claims 
about the particular defendant’s practices rather than offering what 
amounts to a generic lecture on the nature of contemporary 
discrimination. Given that the Court’s criticism of the social framework 
evidence was clearly dicta, it is also quite possible that some courts will 
permit the use of the evidence in its unvarnished previous form. 
One other development is worthy of note. Following the Supreme 
 114.  Stockwell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. C-08-5180 PJH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
117234 (N.D. Ca. Oct. 11, 2011). 
 115.  One such claim involved a gender discrimination challenge to the hiring of entry-level 
sales associates against the company Cintas. In denying class certification the court noted, “As in 
Dukes, the gravamen of [the plaintiffs’] claims is not that . . . objective criteria led to an anti-female 
bias but that subjective decisions made by some of Cintas’s managers favored males because of 
Cintas’s male-dominated culture.” Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 488 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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Court’s decision in Wal-Mart, the plaintiffs began to file smaller 
regional class actions across the country to get around the notion that the 
problem with its nationwide class was primarily its size. As noted above, 
lower courts have seized on the size of the Wal-Mart class as a way of 
limiting the influence of that case, and yet, that has not been true of the 
courts that have tackled the regional Wal-Mart claims, all of which to 
date have failed to gain class certification.116 It is not easy to reconcile 
the consistent treatment of these regional class actions with other cases 
courts have certified as class actions except to suggest that the damning 
language in the Supreme Court decision regarding the plaintiffs’ claims 
may be too difficult to ignore or distinguish in the splintered cases. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Class actions are an important, if imperfect, means of eradicating 
systemic workplace discrimination. As discussed above, many, and this 
seems to include a majority on the Supreme Court, see class actions in a 
very different light; namely, as a means to extort vulnerable employers 
to settle dubious claims. This latter view informed the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wal-Mart, but lower courts sympathetic to class action 
claims have found ways to distinguish that case and to continue to 
certify claims that share a common core. In other words, Wal-Mart did 
not fundamentally change the class action landscape; rather, courts will 
likely continue to approach class action claims much as they did before 
the case was decided. 
 116.  See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (smaller class 
dismissed); Love v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-61959-Civ., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143234 
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2013); Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 875 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); 
Odle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-2954-O, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159351 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 
15, 2012), rev’d, 747 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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